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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE
TERRITORIAL REACH OF FEDERAL PROCESS-,
GERALD ABRAHAMi'-
I.
EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF FEDERAL PROCESS IN
MULTI-PARTY CASES
T HE EXTENT OF A state court's power to take personal juris-
diction over persons and corporations located outside the state has
been expanding steadily since it reached its low-water mark in Pen-
noyer v. Neff.' Not only have the constitutional limitations upon state
court jurisdiction been loosened considerably,2 but more and more
states are pushing their power close to the constitutional brink by means
of various "longarm" statutes. As a result, the jurisdictional hurdle
facing the litigant who wishes to join two or more parties located in
different states is not nearly as formidable as it once was.
Nevertheless, this situation may often present a serious, and
sometimes an insoluble problem. There are still many cases in which
state courts find themselves unable to reach persons whose presence as
parties is desirable if complete justice is to be done. Occasionally, when
such persons are regarded as "indispensable", the court may not be
able to proceed with the action at all."
Generally speaking, the reach of federal process in diversity cases
has paralleled that of the courts of the state in which the federal court
sits.' Consequently, the hapless plaintiff who finds himself confronted
with indispensable party defendants located in different states may be
t Some of the ideas in this article were contained in an address delivered to the
twenty-fifth annual Judicial Conference of the Third Judicial Circuit of the United
States, reprinted in 32 F.R.D. 83 (1963).
tt Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University Law School.
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Before Pennoyer, State power had been broader and more
flexible. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power"
Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956).
2. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), to be dis-
cussed in Part III, infra.
3. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (1956) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05
(Supp. 1963); UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT §§ 1.02,
1.04. See Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. Rev. 909,
1000-08 (1960).
4. Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854); See Reed, Compulsory
Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REv. 327, 483 (1957).
5. The reasons for this parallel will be discussed in Parts II and III, infra.
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without a remedy in any court-state or federal-because of his in-
ability to serve all necessary parties from a single forum. His plight
has not been without a certain amount of scholarly sympathy. Pro-
fessor Barrett, for example, has seen in the multi-party, multi-state
jurisdictional problem a unique role for a national court system and a
realistic modern justification for diversity jurisdiction. He has sug-
gested an extension of the reach of federal process to allow the federal
courts to play this role.6 But, aside from providing for extraterritorial
service of process in federal interpleader actions7 and in certain other
special statutory actions,' Congress has not responded to such
suggestions.
Within the past few months, however, two significant develop-
ments have taken place in this area. One is the "100-mile bulge"
amendment to Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which became effective on July 1, 1963. The other is the publication,
on April 30, by Professors Richard H. Field and Paul J. Mishkin, as
reporters for the American Law Institute, of a series of proposed
amendments to the United States Judicial Code, creating multi-party,
multi-state diversity jurisdiction with world-wide service of process.9
The "100-mile bulge" amendment authorizes service of federal
process, regardless of state lines, anywhere within 100 miles of the
courthouse, on persons who are brought into the action as additional
parties to a counterclaim or cross-claim,'" as impleaded parties," as
indispensable or conditionally necessary parties," and to secure com-
pliance with an order of commitment for civil contempt." This is the
first time, in absence of statute, that the Federal Rules have permitted
service of federal process beyond the reach of the process of the state
in which the district court sits. 14
6. Barrett, Venue and Process in the Federal Courts--Suggestions for Reform,
7 VAND. L. REv. 608 (1954). See 1 BARRON & HOLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 744 (Wright ed. 1960) ; Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation
in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 993-95 (1958).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1958).
8. E.g., 26 Stat. 210 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 5, 62 Stat. 909 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 25
(antitrust); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1692 (federal receivership), 1695 (stockholder's derivative
action), 2321 (I.C.C.) (1958). See 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 4.42 (2d ed. 1948).
9. ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963) (hereinafter cited as ALI].
10. FED. R. Crv. P. 13 (h).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
13. See generally ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT
OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 8-9 (1962) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE
REPORT].
14. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas objected to the adoption of this
amendment. Rule 4(d) (7) has previously been interpreted to permit extraterritorial
service of federal process, but only where a state statute authorizes it. See Farr &
Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental de Navi de Cuba, 243 F. 2d 342 (2d Cir. 1957) ; ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REPORT 6. A similar 100-mile bulge amendment had been recommended
in 1955 but was not adopted by the Supreme Court. See ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON
SUMMER 1963]
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The Field-Mishkin proposal is considerably more far-reaching
than the amendment to Rule 4(f). It would create a special kind of
diversity jurisdiction where "several defendants who are necessary for
a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim are not all amenable to pro-
cess of any one territorial jurisdiction. . ". . " In such cases, worldwide
service of federal process is authorized."
Quite clearly, both the "100-mile bulge" amendment and the Field-
Mishkin proposals constitute extremely useful additions to the federal
jurisdictional armory. They fill a very definite gap in which neither
the state nor the federal courts could do complete justice, and sometimes
could do no justice at all, simply because of their inability to reach all
of the parties. Both the amendment and the proposals have been care-
fully thought out and drafted by eminent scholars. But are they con-
stitutional? It is the purpose of this article to examine that question.
Both the Advisory Committee that drafted the amendments to
the Federal Rules and Professors Field and Mishkin have considered
the question and have concluded that there is no constitutional doubt.
In fact, Professors Field and Miskin felt that it was "almost superfluous
to address a memorandum to that point. Indeed, the very fact of dis-
cussion may serve to stir more doubt than would otherwise have
existed."' 7  The Advisory Committee confines its comment to one
citation, Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree.'
The Murphree case upheld the validity of the expansion by Federal
Rule 4(f) of the reach of federal process from the district to the state.
In the course of the opinion, Chief Justice Stone told us that "Congress
could provide for service of process anywhere in the United States."' 9
His sweeping dicta is supported by similar statements in a succession of
Supreme Court cases dating back to 1838.20 The same view has also
RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 1-2,
5-6, (1954) ; 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE ff 4.01 [11], [12] (1962 Supp.).
15. ALI § 2341(a). Jurisdiction is based upon minimal diversity of citizenship,
that is, where "one of any two adverse parties is a citizen of a State and the other
is a citizen or subject of another territorial jurisdiction." Ibid. This article is not
concerned with the constitutionality of this modification of the rule in Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See ALI 127-37.
16. "Such process may run anywhere within the territorial limits of the United
States, and, subject to the provisions of any treaty, anywhere outside those territorial
limits that process of the United States can reach ... " ALI § 2344 (a). With re-
spect to this type of jurisdiction, the proposals also provide for: venue only in a
district bearing a substantial relationship to the events or property sued upon, ALI
§ 2342; a forum non conveniens transfer to any other district, ALI § 2344(b) ; federal
choice of law rules, ALI § 2344(c) ; proceeding without absent parties even though
they are "indispensable," ALI § 2344(d), (f); discretionary dismissal of actions in
which no interest exceeds five thousand dollars, ALI § 2344(e).
17. ALI 138.
18. 326 U.S. 438 (1946) ; ADVISORY COMMIr'rEE REPORT 9 (1962).
19. 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946).
20. See Eastman Kodak Co. of N. Y. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S.
359, 374 (1927); Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925);
U. S. v. Union Pacific R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 602-04 (1879) ; Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838).
[VOL. 8: p. 520
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been expressed by the lower federal courts,2 and is usually assumed
without extended discussion by commentators. 22 Congress has never
taken full advantage of the blank check so generously offered to it by
the courts and commentators, but has provided for extraterritorial
service of federal process in a number of special statutory actions.23
Clearly, the testimony in favor of the constitutionality of nation-
wide service of federal process is quite formidable. But the fact remains
that the Supreme Court has never been called upon to squarely decide
the issue. The question, therefore, is still an open one and, in view of
recent developments, one that deserves closer examination. This article
will consider two possible sources of constitutional limitations upon the
territorial reach of federal process: (1) the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins 4 and (2) the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
II.
THE ERIE DOCTRINE
To determine the effect of the Erie doctrine upon this problem, it
is necessary to consider two questions: first, whether Erie requires the
federal courts to apply state law, and the constitutional limitations upon
state law to determine the territorial reach of federal process; second,
if so, whether this aspect of Erie is a constitutional command.
There has been a good deal of judicial and scholarly controversy
as to both of these questions. But, curiously, the two answers have
rarely been added together and applied to the general assumption of
Congressional omnipotence in this field.2 If Erie applied and were a
constitutional command, Congress would be powerless. Both amended
Federal Rule 4(f) and any statutory provisions for nationwide service,
including the Field-Mishkin proposals, would be invalid insofar as
they purport to authorize the federal courts in diversity cases to exceed
the limitations on the reach of state process.
21. See, e.g., Limerick v. T. F. Scholes, Inc. 292 F. 2d 195, 196 (10th Cir. 1961)
lovino v. Waterson, 274 F. 2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960)
Haynes Supply Co., Inc. v. Valley Evaporating Co., 261 F. 2d 29, 34 (5th Cir. 1956)
N.L.R.B. v. Gunaca, 230 F. 2d 542, 543 (7th Cir. 1956), remanded with directions to
dismiss as moot, 353 U.S. 902 (1957) ; Piguet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. 609, 611 (No.
11134) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828).
22. See I BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra, note 6, at 747; HART & \VECHSLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEMi 948 (1953) ; Barrett, supra note 6,
at 629-30; Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Pcrsonam of Corporations and I)uc Process.
14 VAND. L. REv. 967, 981 (1961) ; Hill, The Eric Doctrine and the Constituthra, 53
Nw. U. L. REv. 427, 541, 557-58, 566-67 (1958) ; 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 394 (1956) ; 69
HARV. L. REV. 508 (1956) ; 73 HARV. L. REv. 1164 (1960) ; 30 IxD. L. J. 324 (1955).
23. See statutes cited notes 7 and 8 supra.
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25. But see Hill, supra note 22, at 435.
SUMMER 1963]
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In considering these two questions, it might be useful to go over
some familiar ground and briefly retrace the origins and development
of the Erie doctrine. The crucial issue throughout this investigation
will concern the proper function of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
Despite considerable scholarly controversy as to the nature of this
proper function,2" the Supreme Court has been remarkably consistent
in its view.
Almost from the beginning, the Court has expressed the opinion
that the only purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide an alterna-
tive impartial tribunal in each state to protect the out-of-state litigant
from local prejudice in the state courts. Thus, Chief Justice Marshall
stated in Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux:27
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states
will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to
parties of every description, it is not less true that the Constitution
itself either entertains apprehensions on the subject, or views with
such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors,
that it has established national tribunals for the decision of con-
troversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of
different states.
A few years later Mr. Justice Story, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,2"
added that:
No other reason than that which has been stated can be
assigned, why some, at least of those cases should not have been
left to the cognizance of the state courts.
If this were the only purpose of diversity jurisdiction, it would
appear to be a clearly unwarranted usurpation of authority, entirely
aside from any Tenth Amendment problem, for the federal courts to
26. See I BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 6, § 26; 1 CROSSKEY, PoLITIcs
AND 'tHE CONSTITUTION 641-74 (1953) ; FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, THn BusiNEss OF
THE SUPREME COURT 8-10 (1928) ; HART & WEfCiHSLER, op. cit. supra note 22, at
896-97; 1 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 4; ALl 36-44, 70-74, 138-149; Frank,
Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 22-28
(1948); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between the United States and
State Courts, 13 CORNtELL L. Q. 499, 520-30 (1928) ; Friendly, The Historic Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. Rxv. 483 (1928) ; Hill, supra note 22, at 451-55;
Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in
Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L. J., 187, 195-97 (1957) ; Quigley, Congressional Repair of
the Erie Derailment, 60 MICH. L. REv. 1031, 1043-51 (1962) ; Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 81-85 (1923) ;
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234-40 (1948) ; Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Con-
current Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 869 (1931).
27. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
28. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816). For additional citations to early cases
see Warren, op. cit. supra note 26, at 83, where Professor Warren also expresses the
opinion, after an analysis of the historical sources, that there is "not a trace" of any
purpose for diversity jurisdiction to be found in any of the arguments made in 1787-
1789, other than fear of local prejudice.
[VOL. 8: p. 520
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make federal law in diversity cases. Yet this is exactly what the federal
courts did under Swift v. Tyson.29 Did the Supreme Court abandon
the classical view of diversity jurisdiction in Swiftf There is strong
evidence that it did not. Swift represented, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
has put it, "a particular way of looking at the law." 30 The federal
courts under Swift did not regard themselves as "making" federal law.
Both federal and state courts were considered to be applying "a 'brood-
ing omnipresence' of Reason, of which decisions were merely evidence
and not themselves controlling formulations."3 "
Erie abandoned the Swift way of looking at the law. The federal
courts were frankly regarded as making federal law whenever they
applied "general" law. The conflict between federal and state law-
making power thus became a crucial issue. The Court approached the
problem from two different directions: first, from the point of view of
the division of power nationally between the federal government and
the states and second, from the point of view of the purpose of diversity
jurisdiction.
Thus it was decided that when the federal courts made law in
diversity cases, they were encroaching upon power reserved to the
states.3 2 At the same time, the Court reiterated the classic view that:
"Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent
apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not citizens
of the state." 3 Under this view, federal law-making in diversity cases,
in addition to encroaching upon state law-making power, would go
far beyond what was necessary to achieve the limited purpose of diver-
sity jurisdiction. This purpose would be achieved as soon as impartial
judicial personnel were made available in each state to the out-of-state
litigant, as an alternative to the courts of that state. This purpose should
exclude any intention of affording the out-of-stater the possibility of a
different result in the federal court (due to the application of different
rules) than he could get in the courts of the state in which the federal
court was located. In other words, the Court did not seem to be inter-
ested simply in the over-all balance between federal and state law-
making power, it was also concerned with the fact that the federal
courts in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction should not interfere with
"uniformity in the administration of the law of the State."3 4 The impact
of the federal courts within the borders of each state was considered
29. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
30. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945).
31. Id. at 102.
32. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). This aspect of Erie will be
discussed in Part III, infra.
33. Id. at 74:
34. Id. at 75.
SUMMER 1963]
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as serious a problem as the nationwide distribution of power between
the federal government and the states.
A few years later this aspect of the Erie doctrine was given even
further emphasis and, from then on, controlled the development of the
doctrine. If the distribution of law-making power were the only basis
for Erie, the federal courts would be required to apply state law in
diversity cases, but they would be free to choose which state's law ac-
cording to their own choice of law rules. Klaxon v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co.,3 ' however, held that the federal courts were not
free to choose. They were required to decide as would the courts of the
state in which they were sitting, and this required them to apply that
state's choice of law rules. This requirement was based upon "the
principle of uniformity within the state," or that of "equal administra-
tion of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by
side." '3 6
Mr. Justice Frankfurter gave this principle its classic expression
in Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. York,3" in which it was held that a
federal court must apply the statute of limitations of the state in which
it sits. Again emphasizing the limited purpose of diversity jurisdic-
tion,38 Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded, in an often quoted statement,
that in diversity cases "the outcome of the litigation in the federal
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a state court ...
the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead
of in a state court a block away, should not lead to a substantially dif-
ferent result."3 It does not matter whether the state rule in question
is classified as substantive pr procedural, if it is outcome determinative,
the Federal courts must apply it. In short, a Federal court in a diver-
sity case is "in effect only another court of the State... ..
This principle of uniformity of outcome has been roundly criticized
by some scholars,41 but it has been fairly- consistently adhered to by the
35. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
36. Id. at 496.
37. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
38. "Diversity jurisdiction is founded on assurance to non-resident litigants of
courts free from susceptibility to potential local bias. . . . And so Congress afforded
out-of-state litigants another tribunal, not another body of law." Id. at 111-12.
39. Id. at 109.
40. Id. at 108.
41. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv.
489, 512 (1954) : "Thus far the Supreme Court's decisions on these matters seem to be
founded on no higher principle than that of eliminating every possible reason for a
litigant to prefer a federal to a state court. The principle having no readily apparent
stopping place, the reach of the decisions is unclear. What is more important is the
triviality of the principle. The more faithfully it is carried out the more completely
the constitutional and statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction are emptied of in-
telligible meaning." See also Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALe L. J. 267 (1946) ; Hill, supra note 22,
[VOL. 8: p. 520
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courts. Thus, it has been applied by the Supreme Court to require the
application of State law with respect to such "procedural" matters as:
burden of proof,42 availability of a deficiency judgment remedy,43 time
of commencement of an action," capacity of a corporation to sue,45
security in a derivative stockholders suit,46 and stay of an action pend-
ing arbitration.47 The fact that in some of these cases one of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was relied upon in opposition to the state
rule, did not prevent the application of Erie."
In the opinion of some commentators the Supreme Court has
retreated from, or at least tempered, the uniformity of outcome principle
in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Corp.4 That observation is cer-
tainly correct with respect to the facts of the case itself. In deciding
not to follow the state rule that facts determining the coverage of the
state workmen's compensation statute were to be decided by a judge
and not a jury, Mr. Justice Brennan was willing to concede that the
rule might be outcome-determinative. But, noting that the rule was
not bound up with substantive rights and obligations, he found "affirma-
tive countervailing considerations at work."5 He decided that rules
with respect to the judge-jury relationship were an "essential character-
istic" of the Federal courts as "an independent system for administering
justice."'" Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that "the Federal policy
favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions," which was "under
the influence-if not the command-of the Seventh Amendment," out-
weighed the policy behind uniformity of outcome and any state policy
involved.5
2
A few courts have apparently interpreted Byrd as authorizing a
departure from a state outcome-determinative procedural rule whenever
there is a strong federal interest in applying a federal rule.53 But most
at 427-37, 449-56; Keefe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L. Q.
494 (1949) ; Quigley, supra note 26, 1032-34; Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A
Projection, 48 IowA L. Rtv. 248 (1963).
42. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Cities Service Co. v. Dunlap, 308
U.S. 208 (1939).
43. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
44. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
45. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
46. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
47. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
48. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)
(FED. R. Civ. P. 3) ; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (FED. R.
Civ. P. 17 (b) ) ; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)
(FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) ).
49. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). See Quigley, supra note 26, at 1037-41; Smith, Blue
Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36
TUL. L. REv. 443 (1962) ; Vestal, supra note 41, at 262-72.
50. 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
51. Ibid.
52. Id. at 537-38.
53. See Monarch Insurance Co. of Ohio v. Spach, 281 F. 2d 401, 406-09 (5th
Cir. 1960) ; Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F. 2d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 949 (1960) ; Smith, supra note 49, at 449-70; Vestal, supra note 41, at 264-72.
SUMMER 1963]
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post-Byrd decisions seem to have confined the case to rules affecting
the judge-jury relationship."4 At any rate, the reports of the demise
of the uniformity of outcome principle have been greatly exaggerated.
If this principle is applied to rules governing the territorial reach
of process, it seems clear that such rules are outcome-determinative.
Certainly, a rule which determines whether a particular defendant is
amenable to the service of the process of the courts of the state in which
the federal court is located, that is, a rule which determines whether
the action can be maintained in that state at all, bears a greater relation
to the outcome of the litigation than many of the rules which the Su-
preme Court has already classified as outcome-determinative. As Mr.
Justice Douglas indicated, when the Court required the application of
a state rule for the time of commencement of an action: "If recovery
could not be had in the State court, it should be denied in the Federal
court."' 5
Moreover, a federal rule extending the reach of federal process
beyond that of state process seems entirely inconsistent with what is,
in view of Klaxon, the geographically limited nature of the federal
courts in diversity cases. It is incongruous to permit a court, whose
rules of decision in diversity cases are determined entirely by where
its courthouse happens to be situated, to extend its jurisdiction through-
out the nation. To do so, extends the law of the state where the court
is located to persons over whom that state has no jurisdiction.56
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the question of whether
state rules governing the territorial reach of process, or the amenability
of a defendant to service of process, must be applied by the federal
courts in diversity cases."r But in every circuit in which the question
54. See Smith, supra note 49, at 454-56; Wicher, The Erie Doctrine and the
Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution of Their Conflict, 37 TExAs L. REv.
549 (1959). In many cases, the court has continued to apply the outcome-determina-
tive test without mentioning Byrd. See, e.g., Aponte v. American Surety Co. of N. Y.,
276 F. 2d 678, 680 (1st Cir. 1960) ; Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Clay, 265 F. 2d 522,
524-25 (5th Cir. 1959), remanded for determination of state law, 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
55. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949).
56. This seems to have been the result reached in the much criticized case of
Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941), in which Klaxon was applied in spite of
nation-wide service under the Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1952). See Hill,
supra note 22, at 554, 567. It is to avoid this anomaly that the Field-Mishkin pro-
posals release the federal courts from Klaxon where they provide for world wide
service of process. ALI § 2344(c), 98-101.
57. Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Products Corp., 350 U.S. 1003 (1956),
reversed a Seventh Circuit decision which applied state law to hold a defendant not
amenable to service of process. But the court's two sentence per curiam opinion tells
us little about its reasons for reversing: "The Court is of the opinion that the Dis-
trict Court correctly found there was proper service upon the defendant in this case.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is re-
manded to the District Court for further proceedings." Compare the interpretation
of Riverbank in K. Shapiro, Inc. v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722. 725 (E.D.
Mich. 1957), with that in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F. 2d 508, 513(2d Cir. 1960). 9
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has been considered, the Court of Appeals has decided to apply state
law.3 8 At first, the second circuit was contrary. In Jaftex Corp. v.
Randolph Mills, Inc.59 a divided panel decided to apply federal law
because federal standards for amenability to process were part of the
"essentials of a trial according to federal standards."6 But in Arrow-
smith v. United Press International6 the entire court, sitting en banc,
reconsidered the question. Noting that the "overwhelming concensus"
was against Jaftex, the court overruled that case and concluded that
under Erie state law must govern.
Even if Erie does apply to the territorial reach of federal process,
the question remains whether Erie is a constitutional command. On
this point Erie was unambiguous. Mr. Justice Brandeis made it clear
that the Court would not have overruled Swift if it had not been con-
vinced of "the unconstitutionality of the course pursued."62 The opinion
indicated two possible sources of this unconstitutionality.
Its major emphasis was upon constitutional principles of federal-
ism. "Congress has no power," Mr. Justice Brandeis stated, "to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a state .... And no clause
in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal
courts."" It can be argued that if this were the only constitutional
foundation for Erie, the constitutional core of the doctrine would be
much narrower than its application. Klaxon and the principle of uni-
formity of outcome would be outside the core, a mere "gloss"64 on the
basic doctrine. It would follow that the application of Erie to the
territorial reach of process would not be required.
58. See e.g., Smartt v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 318 F. 2d 447 (6th Cir.
1963); Walker v. General Features Corp., 31 U.S.L. Week 2642 (10th Cir. June
25, 1963) ; Shealy v. Challenger Manufacturing Co., 304 F. 2d 102 (4th Cir. 1962) ;
Ark-La Feed & Fertilizer Co. v. Marco Chemicals Co., 292 F. 2d 197 (8th Cir.
1961) ; Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F. 2d 544 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Partin
v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F. 2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953); Canvas Fabricators,
Inc. v. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F. 2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Gravely Motor Plow &
Cultivator Co. v. H. V. Carter Co., 193 F. 2d 158 (9th Cir. 1951); Pulson v.
American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F. 2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948) ; Kenny v. Alaska Airlines
Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
59. 282 F. 2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
60.'Id. at 513. See also from other circuits, K. Shapiro Inc. v. New York Cent.
R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722 (E.D. Mich. 1957) ; General Electric Co. v. Central Transit
Warehouse Co., 127 F. Supp. 817 (W.D. Mo. 1955). This position also has some
scholarly support. See 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, ff 4.25 (2d ed. 1948); Green,
supra note 22, at 977-80; Notes, 56 COLUM. L. Rrv. 394 (1956) ; 69 HARV. L. Rv.
508 (1956). Compare 1 BARRON & HOLTzoFr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 696
(Wright ed. 1960) ; Notes, 6 VILL. L. Rnv 404 (1961) ; 67 YALE L. J, 1094 (1958).
61. 31 U.S.L. Week 2641 (2d Cir. June 25, 1963) (Judge Friendly, who con-
curred in the Jaftex case, wrote the majority opinion. Judge Clark, who wrote the
majority opinion in Jaftex, dissented).
62. 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
63. Id. at 78.
64. Mr. Justice Rutledge dissenting in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 558 (1949).
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But the classic view that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction is
limited to providing an impartial forum for the out-of-state litigant has
been traditionally enunciated as a constitutional doctrine.6 5 When Mr.
Justice Brandeis reiterated it in Erie, he indicated no departure from
this position. This is a constitutional base of Erie that would encom-
pass the principle of uniformity of outcome. If the purpose of diversity
is thus constitutionally limited and the principle of uniformity of out-
come were not faithfully carried out, the federal courts would be per-
forming a function in diversity cases beyond that authorized by Article
III. That the fear of local bias may have no modern basis in facto6
seems more relevant to Congressional policy than to constitutional
doctrine. If true, perhaps Congress should abolish diversity jurisdiction,
rather than adapt it for some other purpose.
Moreover, a departure from the principle of uniformity of outcome,
might result in an even more serious interference with the constitutional
plan than a violation of Article III. It might increase the tension of
the federal presence within each state. As a practical matter the major
dissatisfaction with Swift seems to have been not that the federal courts
were violating an abstract principle of federalism, but the spectacle of
two sets of courts located within the borders of the same state coming
to divergent results in similar cases. Mr. Justice Brandeis recognized
this when in Erie he spoke of the "injustice and confusion," the "dis-
crimination" in favor of the non-resident, and the uncertainty of legal
obligation that resulted from the lack of "uniformity in the administra-
tion of the law of the State."6
More recently, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America,"8 the
Supreme Court has indicated much more clearly the view that the
principle of uniformity of outcome is a constitutional doctrine. The
Court held that a state rule making an agreement to arbitrate unen-
forceable was outcome-determinative and had to be applied by the court
in deciding a motion to stay pending arbitration. Mr. Justice Douglas
stated that the United States Arbitration Act69 was being narrowly
construed as inapplicable in order to avoid the "constitutional ques-
tion ' 70 of the power of Congress under Erie to supersede state outcome-
determinative rules in diversity cases.
65. See Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111-12 (1945)
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816) ; Bank of the United
States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
66. See authorities cited note 26 supra; Summers, Analysis of Factors that In-
fluence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IOWA L. Rtv. 933 (1962).
67. 304 U.S. 64, 74-77 (1938).
68. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
69. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1952).
70. 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956).
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Not all scholarly opinion accepts the Supreme Court view that
Erie is a constitutional command. Some commentators have refused
to accept any constitutional base for Erie at all.7 ' Others confine Erie's
constitutional impact to a limitation upon the substantive law-making
power of the federal government as opposed to that of the states, a
constitutional base which would not include the principle of uniformity
of outcome. 2 Ultimately, the answer depends upon one's view of the
proper place of diversity jurisdiction in the constitutional plan, an issue
to which little objective legal authority can be brought to bear.
III.
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Aside from Erie, another possible source of constitutional limita-
tions upon the territorial reach of federal process is the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. In order to determine the nature of
these limitations it is necessary to examine the nature of -the limitations
upon state process.
Early restrictions upon the reach of state process were based
primarily upon then current international law notions of territorial
sovereignty.73 For this purpose, the states were considered independent
sovereignties. Mr. Justice Field aptly expressed this concept in Pen-
noyer v. Neff :7 "The authority of every tribunal is necessarily re-
stricted to the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.
Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed
in every other forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate
assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse." The courts, in
71. "I take it to be the general understanding that Mr. Justice Brandeis' invoca-
tion of the Constitution as a basis for overruling Swift v. Tyson was a bit of judicial
hyperbole which, having served its purpose, should not be permitted to mislead even
the most literal-minded reader." Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws,
22 U. CHI. L. REv. 405, 468-69 (1955). See Cook, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 136-46 (1942) ; IA MOORE, op. cit. supra note 60, at 3050;
Clark, supra note 41, at 278-79; Keefe, supra note 41, at 496-97. Indeed, Professor
Crosskey goes so far as to say that Erie is unconstitutional. 2 CROSSKEY, op. Cit. supra
note 26, at 865-937.
72. See Hart, supra note 41, at 509-10; Hill, supra note 22, at 427-28, 437-48;
Quigley, supra note 26, at 1056-61; Vestal, supra note 41, at 252-59, 268-69; Wechsler,
supra note 26, at 239 n. 121. See also Kurland, supra note 26, at 188-204. Compare
Wicher, supra note 54, at 550-53.
73. See Cleary, The Length of the Long Arm, 9 J. PUB. L. 293, 294 (1960)
Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 791-817
(1955) ; Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Nonresidents in our Federal
System, 43 CORNELL L. Q. 196, 197 (1957). These notions had particular influence
upon the common law because they coincided with the English conception of the
King as a territorial rather than a feudal sovereign. Beale, Jurisdiction of Courts
over Foreigners, 26 HARV. L. REV. 193, 283-84 (1913). These notions are not con-
sistent with modern international law. Rheinstein, supra, at 797-801.
74. 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877).
SUMMER 1963]
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 4 [1963], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol8/iss4/2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
this early period made no effort to relate these limitations to the
Constitution.
Presumably under the territorial sovereignty theory, federal process
could have reached throughout the nation. But the Judiciary Act of
1789 confined it to the district in which the court was sitting.7' The
courts also derived this limitation from the very fact that they were
organized into districts,7" and from the belief that any other rule would
constitute "an oppression upon suitors, too intolerable to be endured.""11
With the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the courts read
the territorial sovereignty concept into the due process clause.7" The
limitations on state process were thus given a constitutional foundation.
But the reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment was at first somewhat
misleading, for the courts continued to place the emphasis on state's
rights rather than on individual liberty. That is, they were more con-
cerned with the encroachment upon a sister state's sovereignty which
resulted from extraterritorial service, than they were with the rights
of the defendant. As the limitations were then interpreted, a more ap-
propriate source would have been the Full Faith and Credit clause.79
After the Fourteenth Amendment, federal process limitations par-
alleled developments upon the reach of state process, with the excep-
tion that the territory was the district instead of the state. Thus when
corporations were permitted to be sued outside the state of their incor-
poration, the constitutional requirement that they be "doing business"
within a state in order to be amenable to that state's process,8" was
applied without question to require doing business in the district for
amenability to federal process. 8' The same standards were employed to
define "doing business," with federal and state precedents cited inter-
changeably.
75. "But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any
civil action . 1. " I Stat. 79 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1693 (1952) ).
76. As Mr. Justice Story explained in Piguet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. 609, 611(No. 11134) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828), the limitation of federal process to the district in
which the action is commenced "results from the general principle, that a court
created within and for a particular territory is bounded in the exercise of its power
by the limits of such territory. It matters not, whether it be a Kingdom, a state, a
county, or a city, or other local district."
77. Ex parte Graham, 10 Fed. Cas. 911, 912 (No. 5657) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818).
78. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
79. See Rheinstein, supra note 73, at 791, 796.
80. See International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914)
Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. Rxv. 909, 919-23(1960).
81. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320 (1929); Philadelphia &
R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917) ; 2 MOORs, op. cit. supra note 60, at 969;
Notes, 35 COLUM. L. R~v. 591 (1935) ; 69 HARv. L. REv. 508 (1956).
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Did this parallelism mean that federal as well as state limitations
were beginning to be tied to due process? One or two federal courts
so indicated. 2 But generally, until more recently, the courts did not
discuss the source of the limitations on federal process at all. Part of
the reason for avoiding any constitutional discussion with respect to
federal process may have been that the territorial sovereignty approach
to the Fourteenth Amendment limitations on the states had little federal
relevance.
International Shoe Corp. v. Washington,3 however, shifted the
emphasis of these limitations from nineteenth century notions of terri-
torial sovereignty to a concern for fairness to the defendant. Consider-
ing the relationship of the Fourteenth Amendment to the territorial
reach of state process, the Court concluded that "due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ...
An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the corpora-
tion from a trial away from its 'home' or principle place of business is
relevant in this connection."84 It is true, as the court has since pointed
out, that the territorial sovereignty concept has not been completely
abandoned.8" But the shift in emphasis to the interests of the defendant,
rather than those of other states, marked a significant change in the
Court's view of the nature of judicial jurisdiction.
Certainly, the new viewpoint is a great deal more relevant to
federal jurisdiction than was the old territorial sovereignty concept. If
a defendant is forced to litigate in the courts of a distant state with
which he has had no contact, it is considered so unfair to him as to
offend the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"
embodied in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Might it not also be unfair to force him to litigate in the federal court
82. See Chase Bag Co. v. Munson Steamship Line, 295 Fed. 990, 994 (D.C. Cir.
1924); Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 Fed. 566, 577,
588-92 (E.D. Ky. 1922).
83. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
84. Id. at 316-17.
85. See the declaration of the Chief Justice in Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235,
251 (1958), that restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts "are more than
a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a conse-
quence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. However
minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be
called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that State that are
a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him." See Kurland, The Supreme Court.
the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts. 25 U.
Cni. L. Rrv. 569, 619-24 (1958).
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across the street? Might this unfairness not offend the "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" embodied in the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment?
The Supreme Court has not yet answered these questions.8" Nor
has the problem been squarely faced by any more than a very few lower
courts"' and commentators."' In practice, however, the federal courts
have been fairly uniformly applying the International Shoe due process
standards to federal jurisdiction, often relying on that case by name
without discussing why.89
This practice may have a number of different explanations. In
diversity cases, the courts may be applying the Erie doctrine without
saying so, and consequently, using state law "seasoned with appropriate
due process concepts." 9 ° In non-diversity cases, and in circuits where
the application of Erie has been rejected, the courts may merely be
following "Congressional policy."91 Where service is under Federal
Rule 4(d) (7), the courts may be adopting limitations on state process
along with state rules as to the "manner" of service.92 Even where
service is not under Rule 4(d) (7), it may be that Rule 4(f) is being
read as expressing a policy of confining the territorial reach of federal
process generally to that of state process.
9 3
86. In Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 666-67 (1953), the ma-jority opinion stated that the Court expressed no opinion whether the defendant in
a federal court action was doing business in the state "within the meaning of the due
process requirements set out in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington ....
87. See Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F. 2d 508, 510 (2d Cir. 1960) ;
Lone Star Package Car Inc. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 212 F. 2d 147, 153-54 (5th Cir.
1954); Woodworkers Tool Works v. Byrne, 191 F. 2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1951);
Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 778, 782-83 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
88. See Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due
Process, 14 VAND. L. REv. 967, 970 (1961) ; 35 COLUM. L. RE:v. 591 (1935) ; 69 HARV.
L. Rgv. 508 (1956) ; 30 IND. L. J. 324 (1955).
89. See, e.g., L. D. Reeder Contractors of Ariz. v. Higgins Industries, Inc., 265
F. 2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Scholnik v. National Airlines, Inc. 219 F. 2d 115 (6th
Cir. 1955) cert. denied, 349 U.S. 956 (1955) ; Consolidated Cosmetics v. D-A Pub-
lishing Co., 186 F. 2d 906 (7th Cir. 1951); Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F.
Matarazzo, 175 F. 2d 184 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 867 (1949) ; Bach v.
Friden Calculating Machine Co., 167 F. 2d 679 (6th Cir. 1948) ; Clover Leaf Freight
Lines, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Wholesalers Ass'n, 166 F. 2d 626 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 823 (1948) ; Powell v. Sealectro Inc., 205 F. Supp. 6 (D. Conn. 1962) ;
The Southern New England Distributing Corp. v. Berkly Finance Corp., 30 F.R.D.
43 (D. Conn. 1962) ; Ostow & Jacobs, Inc. v. Morgan-Jones, Inc. 178 F. Supp. 150
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; Clifton Products, Inc. v. American Universal Insurance Co. 169 F.
Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Dam v. General Electric Co., 111 F. Supp. 342 (E.D.
Wash. 1953) ; Ott v. Hudnut Sales Co., Inc., 107 F. Supp. 919 (D. Col. 1952).
90. Bar's Leaks Western Inc. v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 710, 713 (N.D. Cal. 1957)
(dictum).
91. See Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc. 282 F. 2d 508, 510, 512, 516 (2d
Cir. 1960).
92. See Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co. 170 F. 2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948).
93. See Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F. 2d 508, 516 (2d Cir. 1960).
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On the other hand, it is possible that the courts, in at least some
of these cases, are evolving Fifth Amendment due process standards to
parallel the Fourteenth Amendment due process standards being devel-
oped with respect to the states. At any rate, the question with respect.
to the power of Congress is still open since no due process objection,
based on unfairness to the defendant, has yet been raised to a statute in
which Congress has expressly authorized nationwide service of process.
The Advisory Committee avoided this question in connection with
the "100-mile bulge" amendment. They pointed out that "In the light
of present-day facilities for communication and travel, the territorial
range of service allowed ... can hardly work hardship upon the parties
summoned. . . . The amendment is but a moderate extension of the
territorial reach of Federal process. . . ."" This is probably correct in
most cases."' Even if the Fifth Amendment places restrictions of fair-
ness upon the territorial reach of federal process, the outer limits of
fairness do not necessarily run along state borderlines.
The Field-Mishkin proposals, however, present more of a due
process problem." They authorize world-wide service of process. It
is true that the proposals minimize the possibilities of hardship by con-
fining venue to a district substantially related to the events being sued
upon, 7 by authorizing a transfer to any other district,98 and by author-
izing a dismissal as to a particular party, or of the entire action, "when
the application of the section would lead to undue burden on distant
parties, and the monetary value of each interest which may be adversely
affected by such disposition does not exceed the sum of $5,000. . .. ""
But, in actions in which an interest worth more than five thousand
dollars may be affected, there remains the possibility of serious hard-
ship to a party brought into a distant state with which he has never
had any contact. The proposals contain no provisions for relief to such
distressed parties.
The Reporters argue that "Since these are by hypothesis parties
whose absence could prevent a just adjudication, there is sufficient
justification to bring them into court even from substantial distances."' 00
94. ADviSORy COMMITTEE REPORT 9.
95. But the very act of crossing over into another state for litigation, no matter
what the distances are, may cause a certain amount of hardship. See the comment of
Judge Nordbye on the 1955 "100-mile bulge proposal". Comments on Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts. 18
F.R.D. 105, 106 (1956). It may also be desirable, as a matter of policy, to continue
using the permissable reach of state process as a convenient guide line of fairness.
96. The Reporters side-step the due process question in their supporting memoran-
dum on "the constitutionality of service of federal court process without regard to
State boundaries." ALI 138, n. 1.
97. ALI § 2342.
98. ALI § 2344(b).
99. ALI § 2344(e).
100. ALI 97.
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Any hardship to the non-resident litigant, they conclude, "may well be
deemed a cost which he must bear as a part of organized society."''1
Of course, in this last conclusion, lies the whole constitutional issue.
The courts have traditionally placed limits upon the price that we
must pay, in the form of responding to service of process, for living in
an organized society. At least with respect to state process, these limits
have in part had a constitutional basis in the form of due process pro-
tection against inconvenient litigation. Inevitably, any such protection
extended to a defendant interferes with the plaintiff's ability to obtain
a judicial remedy. But the nature and extent of such protection has
never varied with the need of the plaintiff or the amount in controversy.
The constitutional bias has been in favor of protecting the individual
from government coercion, rather than in favor of making it available
to him.There appears to be more than a similarity of verbiage between
the due process clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.
There is no clear reason why the "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" embodied in the Fifth Amendment should not also
encompass some measure of protection against inconvenient litigation,
even though the protection is not identical to that afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment. While the Field-Mishkin proposals make
no specific provision for permitting the litigant in a case involving
more than five thousand dollars to claim such constitutional protection,
it is clear that they cannot prevent him from doing so. But it seems
unwise to force the litigant to the constitutional brink in each instance.
Some orderly procedure should be provided whereby the court has
discretionary authority, without making a constitutional decision, to
relieve a litigant of the duty to respond to inconvenient litigation.
One possible solution would be to extend the provisions of Section
2344(e)"0 2 to cases involving more than five thousand dollars. Such
a change would be desirable even if it is felt that the individual is en-
titled to no Fifth Amendment protection from inconvenient federal
litigation. It is difficult to say that in no case involving more than five
thousand dollars could greater injustice result to a defendant by forcing
him to respond, than to the plaintiff by continuing the case without
that defendant or by dismissing it altogether. The change may result
in some loss in the overall efficiency of the proposals because of in-
creased motion practice, but in view of the fundamental, if not
constitutional, rights involved, that would be a small price to pay.
101. ALI 102.
102. See text at note 99, supra.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
It is generally assumed that there are no constitutional limitations
upon the territorial reach of federal process. Closer examination, how-
ever, reveals judicial authority which may be added up to yield two
possible sources of constitutional limitations.
One source is the Erie doctrine, which has been widely applied to
rules governing the reach of federal process. There is evidence that
the Supreme Court continues to hold the view expressed in the original
opinion; namely, that the Erie doctrine is constitutionally compelled.
The other source is the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been con-
strued to protect an individual from inconvenient state litigation. Simi-
lar protections have been afforded in federal litigation. There are indi-
cations that the courts consider at least part of the basis of this pro-
tection of the federal litigant to be the parallel provisions of the Fifth
Amendment.
These possible constitutional limitations cast doubt upon the val-
idity of existing provisions for extraterritorial service of federal process,
including the recent "100-mile bulge" amendment to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. They also bear upon the validity or the wisdom
of some of the proposals by Professors Field and Mishkin to the
American Law Institute for world-wide service of process in multi-
party, multi-state cases.
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